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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CHARITABLE TRUSTS - FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT APPLICABLE TO PRIvATE TRUSTEES OF "PUBLIC"

Under the provisions of a 1911 will, certain land located
in Macon, Georgia, was placed in trust to be used as a park
exclusively for Caucasians. The city of Macon was designated as
trustee, subject to the control of a board of managers. In 1963, the
PARK. -

members of this board brought an action against the city, alleging
that it had violated the provisions of the will by admitting Negroes

to the park. The city was permitted to resign and the Georgia
court appointed new trustees. Six Negroes, residents of Macon,

intervened and contended that the reservation of the park to white
persons violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court held that the public
character of the park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment, regardless of who had title under state law. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966).
The fourteenth amendment was adopted primarily to protect
individual rights from infringement by the states.1 Since the Civil
Rights Cases,2 however, it has been an established principle that
private discrimination is in no way circumscribed. To the United
States Supreme Court, it seemed axiomatic that state action was
distinguishable from private action. 3 With time, however, the concept
of state action has been extended to bring activity formerly viewed
as private within constitutional limitations.
Soon after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court extended its application to include not only state
legislative action (indicated by the word "law" in the privileges
and immunities clause), but also action by agencies of the state
directly concerned with a governmental function.' Acts of public
"For an expansive discussion of the equal protection clause, see Frank
and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws,"
50 COLUm. L. REv. 131 (1950).
2 109 U.S. 3 (1882).
3 Difficulty was perceived by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1882). He maintained that common carriers,
inns, and places of amusement were instrumentalities of the state and thus
subject to the limitation of the fourteenth amendment See Weston, John
Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation 4of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957).
E.g., Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (county); Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (city); Ex pare
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (state court).
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officials, not authorized or demanded by state law, were also held
to be state action in early cases." Iridividual action by state officials
acting "under color of law" was held subject to the limitations of
the fourteent1h amendment, 'even where the official's conduct was
criminal,6 or where he was not acting in an official capacity.7
In Smith v. Allwri'ht s the Supreme Court for the first time
applied constitutional restrictions to a private organization. The
*Court held that the Democratic Party of Texas was engaged in
5tate action, arid that the exclusion' of Negroes from its membership
was violafive of the Constitution.
;[T]he recognition of- the place of the primary in the electoral scheme, makes
clear that state delegation to a party of the poower to fix qualiflcatiqns of
primary elections is delegation of a, state function that may make the party's
action the action of the State. 9

'principle was extended,-in Terry v. Adams,'0 wherein it was
'held that 'a political organization that conducted its own straw
primary prior to the statutory primary' was also subject to constitu°tional limitations in: choosing iU membership.
In Smith and Terry, private organizations, were held subject
to the Constitution when they assumed a function which the Court
regarded as the exclusive function of the state. Similarly, in Marsh
v. Alabama,1 a company was engaged in what the Court believed
was exclusively a state, function, i.e., the operation of a municipality
A Jehovah's Witness distributed religious
(a company town).
literature on the company-owned sidewalk. Upon her refusal to
leave, she was arrested and convicted of trespass. The Supreme
Court, in reversing the conviction, held that the defendant's freedoni
of speech and religion had been abridged. By operating a municipality, a privat organization Was held to act for the state, although
no state statute, policy, or official condoned the constitutional
violation.
2
it was
In an impDortant state action case, Shielley v. Kraemer,1
held- that-state -court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
:was .a denial of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the
'fourteenth amendment. The covenant was judicially unenforceable
because the state lacked power to limit-land tenure and occupancy
by race. -Thus, the aid of the court was sought to compel behavior
i ,'-which -the state itself could no. have engaged. In Barrows v.
5 Ex pqrte Virginia, supra note 4.
6 Screws v. United State5, 325 U.S. 91 (1945').
7 Griffin -v. MAiryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
8 321 .U.S. 649 f1944)-.:2-s"'
9 Smith 'v. Allwright, 321 Ut.Sc649, 660 (1944).
10 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
"1326 U.S. 501 (1946).
- 12 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Jackson,'3 the Court indicated its allegiance to this doctrine, holding
unconstitutional the award of damages for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant.
The Court, however, has never indicated possible limitations to
the Shelley doctrine. Some writers suggest that the doctrine is
limited to discriminatory covenants or to discriminatory contracts
Others
where there is a willing seller and a willing buyer."4
suggest that the Shelley rationale may be extended so that the only
private discrimination that may be practiced is that voluntarily
accepted by the parties, and, that once the sanction of a court is
sought, state action results,' 5 Therefore, one could not refuse to
sell to a Negro solely on the basis of his color if the Negro sought
judicial aid in enjoining the practice. It is doubtful whether the
Court intended to extend the fourteenth amendment to such a degree
that it would become an omnipotent law, regulating all human
conduct. The Shelley doctrine seems to apply only in the situation
where a court is asked to enforce private discrimination, and not6
where a court refuses to interfere with individual discrimination.'
In 1957, the city of Philadelphia, serving as trustee of an allwhite school for orphans created under a will, refused to admit two
17
Negro boys. Citing only Brown v. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court held that the city was engaged in activity prohibited
by the fourteenth amendment.'" On remand, the Pennsylvania
courts held that if the identity of the trustee required a finding of
state action the proper remedy would be substitution of a private
The Supreme
trustee, not the excision of the limitation to whites.'
Court refused to review this decision, 20 declining to pass on the
continued discrimination now in private guise. Similarly, in Evans
v. Newton,21 the Georgia courts attempted to avoid constitutional
limitations by the mere change from public to private trustees.
Repeatedly emphasizing the particular facts and circumstances
before the Court, the majority in Evans stated the principle that
conduct formally private may become so entwined with governmental
policy or endowed with functions so governmental in nature that it
becomes subject to constitutional limitations. Assuming that the
city would continue to maintain the park, and that the private
"3346 U.S. 249 (1953).
'4 Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L.
213, 235-36 (1956).

REv.

15 Huber, Revolution in Private Law?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 8 (1953).
'G Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1959).
17347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958). ,
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570, motion
for rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
21220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
1s

'9
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trustees would continue segregation, in the park, the, Court -held
that because of the public character and function of the park, the
substitution of trustees could not make the park private. Oace the
tradition of the park as a public function had been established, the
fourteenth amendment applied, regardless of who had title under
state law.
Mr. Justice White disagreed with the majority's assumption
that the city remained involved in the management and control of
the park. Indeed, the lower court's record was silent on this point.
Nevertheless, he concurred with the conclusion, finding state action
in a Georgia law authorizing racially discriminatory charitable
trusts. 2 2 He found it unlikely that charitable trusts for a limited
class of persons were lawful before the passage of this law; and
concluded that the state had become so involved that the racial
restriction reflected state policy and therefore violated the fourteenth
amendment.
In a separate opinion, Justices Harlan and Stewart contended
In
that no justiciable issue had been presented to the Court.23
addition, they objected to the use of the "public function" theory.
They could find only one other fourteenth amendment case, Marsh
v. Alabanma, 24 in which this theory had been utilized. No stronger
case for the "public function" approach could be imagined, they
pointed out, and the case was not the basis for any other Supreme
Court decision. They concluded:
While thisprocess of analogy might be spun out to reach privately owned
orphanages, libraries, garbage collection companies, detective agencies, and
a host of other functions commonly regarded as nongovernmental though
paralleling fields of governmental activity, the example of schools is . . .
sufficient to indicate the pervasive potentialities of this "public function"
theory of state action. It substitutes for the comparatively clear and concrete
tests of state action a catch-phrase approach as vague and amorphous as it is
far-reaching. ... And it carries the seeds of transferring to federal authority
vast areas of concerns 25whose regulation has wisely been left by the
Constitution to the States.
This was the approach used in the
22 GA. CoDE AN . § 69-504 (1957).
decisions involving sit-in demonstrations. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
23 In his dissent, Mr. Justice Black found that the Court's decision was in
the nature of an advisory opinion. He pointed out that the lower court had
only accepted the resignation of the city as trustee and appointed new trustees.
No federal question had been decided and there was no indication that the
new trustees would operate the park on a discriminatory basis. Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 312 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
24 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
The white primary cases Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), arose under
the fifteenth amendment; the principles are the same.
25 382 U.S. 296, 322 (1966). The press concurred, at least in part, with

the dissenters. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1966, § 4, p. 10; Time, Jan. 28, 1966,
p. 40.
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It is a matter of conjecture whether the Court's opinion will
apply only to trusts which provide for both discrimination and a
governmental trustee, or if it will be extended to the degree feared
by the dissenters. At least one Supreme Court Justice would extend
the concept of state action to include all businesses which serve
the public and are licensed and supervised by the state.2 A more
is probable, but logical limitations
moderate and selective approach
27
are not easily formulated.
The decision in Evans does not make all charitable trusts subject
to constitutional limitations. However, it is impossible to escape
elements of state action inherent in all charitable trusts, even those
administered by private trustees. There are special privileges
accorded these trusts as contrasted with private trusts, including
Sometimes,
exemption from taxation and perpetual existence2
exemption from tort liability exists. 29 Frequently, charitable trusts
are enforced by the state attorney general.30 In many instances,
the trust funds are utilized for purposes which fall within the
Supreme Court's definition of "public function."
To avoid possible invalidation of the majority of charitable
trusts, several approaches are available. To obviate the problem
before it arises, the settlor's freedom to discriminate may be
curtailed by state statute. 3' Application of the cy pres doctrine,
generally permitted only when the implementation of the settlor's
purpose becomes impossible or illegal, gives courts discretion to
alter the trusts within the general intention of the testator. 2 Judicial
restraint has precluded the use of cy pres to any great extent, but
20
Lombard v. Louisiana, supra note 22, at 282 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242-60 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
27 There are several state court decisions discussing elements of discrimination and state action which the Supreme Court has refused, on one ground
or another, to set aside. In Charlotte Park & Recreation Conm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956),
noted in 30 ST. JoHiq's L. REv. 285 (1956), the court held that a gift of
land to a city on the condition that it not be used by Negroes created a possibility of reverter which could operate without affirmative state action. See
also Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 243 Iowa 147, 60
N.W.2d 110, aff'd per curiam, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), judgment of affiriance
vacated, cert. dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955), in which the state court upheld
a restriction in a contract for the purchase of a burial lot to members of the
Caucasian race.
2s 4 ScorT, TRusTs §§ 348.4, 365 (2d ed. 1956).
29 See generally Paossaa, ToRTs § 127 (3d ed. 1964).

30 4 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 28, § 391. N.Y. REAL PRop. LA W § 113 (3);

N.Y. Pzas. PuoP. LAW § 12.
31 See N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 313, which prohibits discrimination in private
education.
32 Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Will of
Stephen Girard, 66 YAa L.. 979, 1000 (1957); 4 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note
28, §§ 367.2, 399.
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altering the terms of a trust to permit desegregation may be preferable to transferring the trust property to the holder of the testator'sreversionary interest.
Moreover, the fourteenth amendment does not forbid all discrimination. A trust for a-religious purpose is sufficiently protected
by the first amendment; thus, the equal protection clause is of
secondary importance. Discrimination by rational classification isnot a denial of equal protection of the laws.3 3 For example, a trust
for one sex or age group could be established if a reasonable
objective would be served. As a corollary, with the realization
that absolute equality will never be achieved or even defined, courts
might measure discrimination by its effect on the community. Thus,
a distinction might be drawn between the psychologically harmful
segregated school and the beneficial racially restricted scholarship
fund.
The pervasive qualities of the "public function" theory may be
limited by the adjective "exclusive." The maintenance of a public
park has traditionally been considered a state function, as have
been the conduction of elections and the operation of municipalities.
Neither orphanages nor schools have been exclusively in the public
domain.3 4 This has been the approach of the Supreme Court in
the white primary cases as well as in Marsh.
, In Evans, the Court merely affirmed its position that the
fourteenth amendment is directed at community arrangements and
that its mandates- cannot be circumscribed by local concepts of
property. By considering the effect of the activity on the community
rather than the label of private or public, the Court has looked to
the substance of the activity and has refused to follow an inflexible
formula similar to the approach of absolute dichotomy between
private3 5 and public, espoused by the majority in the Civil Rights
Cases.
While society favors the creation of charitable trusts, there is
no basis for tolerating trusts that are whimsical, harmful, or discriminatory. By cautious application of the term "state action"
under the fourteenth amendment, and through utilization of the
s Cf. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), upholding a state law
prohibiting females from being bartenders.
34 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). A helpful, although
perhaps inaccurate; analogy may be made to the distinction drawn between
governmental and proprietary functions in sovereign tort immunity cases.

See PRossER, op. cit. mupra note 29. Thus, if a private individual engages in
what is considered a governmental -function, he is subject to constitutional
limitations. Proprietary functions, not the exclusive function of the state,
may be engaged in by private persons without such restrictions. This analogy

indicates the difficulties that may be encountered.
s5 109 U.S. 3 (1882).
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realistic approach of the Supreme Court, courts will avoid the
wholesale destruction of charitable trusts while removing discrimination from areas hitherto beyond the reach of the Constitution.

x
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REmovAL OF FEERA.L JUDGES RELIEF DENIEn FROm INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF JUDICIAL
COUNCIL. - A meeting of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit
of the United States reviewed the actions of Chief Judge Stephen
Chandler concerning the affairs of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma. An order was issued,
purportedly under authority of a federal statute,' stating that Judge
Chandler, being presently unable, or unwilling, to discharge efficiently
the duties of his office, was to take no action whatever in any case
or proceeding then or thereafter pending before his court. Judge
Chandler applied to Mr. Justice White, Circuit judge for the Tenth
Circuit, to stay the order of the Judicial Council. The application
was referred to the Supreme Court which held that since the action
was entirely interlocutory in character, the relief requested should
be denied pending further proceedings. Chandler v. Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966).
During the middle ages, royal officials of England held their
offices either "during good behavior" or "during the King's pleasure. ' 2 In addition, English judges could be disenfranchised by
impeachment proceedings in the legislature or by writ of scire facias
in the courts. 3 However, the English Act of Settlement,' enacted
subsequent to the Puritan Revolution, was interpreted as providing
that English judges held their offices "during good behavior," 5 and
that they could be removed only for misconduct upon address by
Since it appears that the writ of
both Houses of Parliament.
scire facias had not been employed for some time, there was no

U.S.C. §332 (1964).
128
2
Ross, "Good Behavior" of Federal Judges, 12 U. Kw. CITy L.

REV.

119, 120O (1944).

3Id. at 120-22. Late in the 16th century, the word "impeachment!' began
to acquire its present meaning of accusing a person of a high crime or mis-

demeanor. Yankwich, Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal
Constitution, 26 GEo. L.J. 849 (1938). On the other hand, scire facias was a
writ requesting that authority given be repealed. BLACE, LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1951).

4Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2.
GRoss, supra note 2, at 119-21.
aAct of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2; see BoRxIN, TiE CoR-

RUPT JUDGE 193 (1962).

